

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JOHN T. WOOD, #628581,

Plaintiff,

-against-

SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
P.O. SEAN MCAULIFFE, #6120, P.O. MCCRORY, #6006,

Defendants.  
-----X

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

**ORDER**

12-CV-6093(SJF)(GRB)

**FILED**

IN CLERK'S OFFICE  
U S DISTRICT COURT E D N Y

★ JUN 30 2013 ★

**LONG ISLAND OFFICE**

I. Introduction

On December 7, 2012, incarcerated *pro se* plaintiff John T. Wood (“plaintiff”) filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against defendants Suffolk County Police Department (“SCPD”), P.O. Sean McAuliffe, #6120 (“McAuliffe”) and P.O. McCrory, #6006 (“McCrory”) (collectively “defendants”) without remitting the filing fee or moving to proceed *in forma pauperis*. On December 11, 2012, the Clerk of the Court sent plaintiff a Notice of Deficiency advising plaintiff that in order to proceed with this action, he must either pay the three hundred fifty dollar (\$350.00) filing fee or file an application to proceed *in forma pauperis*, a copy of which was enclosed with the Notice of Deficiency. On December 21, 2012, plaintiff filed an application to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Since plaintiff’s financial status, as set forth in his declaration in support of the application to proceed *in forma pauperis*, qualifies him to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the application for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. However, for the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s claims against the SCPD are dismissed.

## II. The Complaint

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges, in essence, that on January 27, 2012, at approximately 5:40 p.m., he was falsely arrested by McAuliffe and McCrory and charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree based upon the perjured testimony of McAuliffe. Plaintiff seeks the dismissal of all of the criminal charges against him, as well as compensatory and punitive damages in an unidentified amount. (Compl., ¶ V).

## III. Discussion

### A. Standard of Review

Under both the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the *in forma pauperis* statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B). See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding both Section 1915 and Section 1915A to be applicable to a prisoner proceeding *in forma pauperis*).

It is axiomatic that district courts are required to read *pro se* complaints liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)); Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), and to construe them “to raise the strongest arguments [that they] suggest[.]” Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations, alterations and citations omitted). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint.” Harrington v. County of Suffolk, 607 F.3d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

Nevertheless, a complaint must plead sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed.2d

929 (2007). The pleading of specific facts is not required; rather a complaint need only give the defendant “fair notice of what the \* \* \* claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (quotations and citation omitted);see also Anderson News, LLC v. American Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 182 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied by Curtis Circulation Co. v. Anderson News, LLC, 2013 WL 57139 (Jan. 7, 2013) (accord). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955); see also Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (accord). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, \* \* \* on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. at 1959; see also Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (accord). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; see also Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (accord).

B. Section 1983

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part:

“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .”

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was “committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and (2) that such conduct “deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir.

1994)); see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501-02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).

1. Claims against the SCPD

“[U]nder New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and therefore, cannot sue or be sued.” See Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Robischung-Walsh v. Nassau County Police Department, 699 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 421 Fed. Appx. 38 (2d Cir. Apr. 29, 2011). Since the SCPD is an administrative arm of the County of Suffolk (“the County”), it lacks the capacity to be sued. See, e.g. Carthew v. County of Suffolk, 709 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Davis v. Riverhead Correction Facility, No. 11-cv-5667, 2011 WL 6131791, at \* 2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2011). Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice as against the SCPD. However, since plaintiff is proceeding *pro se*, his complaint will be construed as being brought against the County.

“[A] municipality [or municipal entity] can be held liable under Section 1983 if the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality [or municipal entity].” Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). “Absent such a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held liable on a *respondeat superior* basis for the tort of its employee.” Id.; see also Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011) (holding that under Section 1983, governmental bodies are not vicariously liable for their employees’ actions); Los Angeles County, California v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 452, 178 L. Ed. 2d 460 (2010) (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely for the acts of others, e.g., *solely* because it employs a tortfeasor.” (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted)); Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a municipal entity, a plaintiff must show: “(1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359 (“Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under Section 1983 must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018)); Humphries, 131 S.Ct. at 452 (“[A] municipality may be held liable when execution of a government’s *policy or custom* . . . inflicts the injury.” (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted)).

“A municipal policy may be pronounced or tacit and reflected in either action or inaction.” Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741, 182 L. Ed. 2d 528 (2012). “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359. In addition, municipal liability can be established “by showing that a policymaking official ordered or ratified the employee’s actions— either expressly or tacitly.” Jones, 691 F.3d at 81. “Thus, a plaintiff can prevail against a municipality [or municipal entity] by showing that the policymaking official was aware of the employee’s unconstitutional actions and consciously chose to ignore them.” Id. To establish such deliberate indifference, “a plaintiff must show that a policymaking official was aware of constitutional injury, or the risk of constitutional injury, but failed to take appropriate action to prevent or sanction violations of constitutional rights.” Id. “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). “[D]eliberate indifference

requires a showing that the official made a conscious choice, and was not merely negligent.” Id.; see also Cash, 654 F.3d at 334.

“[D]eliberate indifference may be inferred where the need for more or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations was obvious \* \* \* but the policymaker failed to make meaningful efforts to address the risk of harm to plaintiffs.” Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (quotations, alterations and citations omitted). Moreover, “[i]n limited circumstances, a [municipal entity’s] decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of Section 1983.” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359. “To satisfy [Section 1983], a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the untrained employees come into contact.” Id. (internal quotations, alterations and citation omitted). “A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Id. “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id. at 1360.<sup>1</sup>

To state a claim for municipal liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege more than that a municipal policy or custom exists. See Santos v. New York City, 847 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). “Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts tending to support, at least circumstantially, an inference that such a municipal policy or custom exists.” Id.

Since the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations tending to support an inference

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<sup>1</sup> Although the Supreme Court recognized “a narrow range of \* \* \* hypothesized single-incident liability” based upon “an obvious need for some form of training,” Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1361, this case does not fall within that narrow and “rare” range of cases, particularly because plaintiff does not allege a complete lack of training of SCPD personnel or that SCPD staff had an “utter lack of an ability to cope with constitutional situations” that existed in the hypothesized single-incident case. Id. at 1363.

that a municipal policy or custom existed that caused the alleged constitutional deprivation of which plaintiff complains, it fails to state a Section 1983 claim against the County. See, e.g., White v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 369 Fed. Appx. 225, 226 (2d Cir. Mar.10, 2010) (affirming *sua sponte* dismissal of Section 1983 claim for the plaintiff's failure "to allege that any of the allegedly unconstitutional actions were taken pursuant to an official policy or custom, as is required to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality."); see generally City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d at 37–41. Plaintiff has not alleged: (1) the existence of a formal policy which is officially endorsed by the County or SCPD; (2) actions taken or decisions made by County or SCPD policymaking officials which caused the alleged violations of his civil rights; (3) a County or SCPD practice so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law; or (4) a failure by County or SCPD policymakers to properly train or supervise their subordinates, amounting to "deliberate indifference" to the rights of those who come in contact with their employees. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims, as construed to be against the County, are dismissed.

a. Leave to Amend

Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party shall be given leave to amend "when justice so requires." Nevertheless, "[l]eave to amend, though liberally granted, may properly be denied for: 'undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.'" Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)); see also Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008). "[W]hen addressing a *pro se* complaint, a district court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication

that a valid claim might be stated.” Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotations and citation omitted); see also Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint correcting the pleading deficiencies in his claims against the County, **provided that any such amended complaint is filed on or before March 4, 2013**, or the claims against the County will be deemed dismissed with prejudice.

## 2. Claims Seeking Dismissal of Criminal Charges

Plaintiff’s claims seeking the dismissal of the criminal charges pending against him in state court are barred by the abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), which precludes federal courts from interfering with pending state prosecutions absent “special circumstances” not present here. Id. at 41, 91 S. Ct. 746; see e.g. Thompson v. 90<sup>th</sup> Precinct, No. 10-CV-4329, 2010 WL 3927567 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010). Accordingly, those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

## IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s application to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted; plaintiff’s claims against the SCPD and seeking the dismissal of the pending criminal charges against him are dismissed with prejudice; and plaintiff’s claims against the County are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim for relief **unless plaintiff files an amended complaint in accordance with this Order on or before March 4, 2013**. The Clerk of Court is directed to forward copies of the summonses, the complaint and this Order to the United States Marshal Service for service upon McAuliffe and McCrory without prepayment of fees, and to mail a copy of this Order to the *pro*

se plaintiff.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).

**SO ORDERED.**

s/ Sandra J. Feuerstein

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Sandra J. Feuerstein  
United States District Judge

Dated: January 30, 2013  
Central Islip, New York